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INTRODUCTION
Creative defendants regularly employ tactics compelling plaintiffs to
reevaluate or abandon their litigation position. For example, if the defendant
discovers that the plaintiff has failed to meet a third-party compliance
obligation, the defendant may report, or threaten to report, the failure in order
to coerce the plaintiff.1 Some evidence suggests that hospital management
organizations have used this tactic to compel settlements from competitors
committing antitrust violations.2 In some instances, the enforcing third party
may be a private, rather than a government, actor.3 Regardless of the
enforcing party’s specific character, so long as the violation’s disclosure will
1. Though such threats may be susceptible to actions for extortion as discussed in greater detail
herein.
2. See, e.g., Nina Youngstrom, Hospitals Have Options to Level the Playing Field with
Noncompliant Competitors, AISHEALTH (October 26, 2015), https://aishealth.com/archive/rmc10261501 (reprinted from REPORT ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE, Volume 24 Issue 38)
Given the stakes, health care organizations may want to take matters into their own hands, lawyers say . . . We see
health care organizations trying very hard and devoting significant resources to compliance efforts, but if their
competitors are not following suit, that becomes a real problem . . . there are a number of ways to go about it. They
include reporting a competitor’s misconduct to its own hotline, using the private right of action under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and tipping off the government. . . . The antitrust laws are
another avenue for challenging conduct that health care organizations believe is illegal . . . .

Particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) permits a civil action for injury following violation of § 1962 regarding
racketeering activity. As another example application, consider, e.g., Corcel Corp. v. Ferguson
Enterprises, Inc., 551 F. App’x 571 (11th Cir. 2014) wherein a plumber subjected their competition to a
RICO suit. Contrast, e.g., Stenehjem v. Sareen 226 Cal. App. 4th 1405 (6th Dist. 2014) (finding
extortion). Compare the posture of these cases with subsequent footnotes in this Article regarding the use
of a third party beneficiary claim to obviate extortion arguments. While the “influence” diagrams are very
similar, the mechanism necessary to pose the threat without implicating extortion may differ greatly.
3. For example, where the compliance breach implicates a contractual obligation for a third party
(as is the case with regard to some open source licenses, such as the GPL, which includes a source code
copyleft obligation, unlike the MIT and BSD licenses, which do not), the third party may be the enforcing
interest. Additionally, the defendant may itself be the enforcing interest in some instances such as in a
qui tam action (as in the case of certain actions under the False Claims Act). Similarly, though the tactics
discussed in this Article refer to open source specifically, much of the same reasoning and logic applies
mutatis mutandis to third party patent infringement actions.
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precipitate action against the plaintiff, the knowledge of the violation may
provide the defendant with leverage to effect a favorable settlement.4
Open source software presents an emerging and compelling vehicle for
these compliance-based defense tactics.5 It is not entirely clear whether the
defendants employed these tactics in the recent XimpleWare v. Versata
collection of cases (See Section I.A below, hereinafter collectively referred
to as XimpleWare), but the XimpleWare fact pattern illustrates the potential
effectiveness and limitations of such tactics. While news and legal
commentators have previously discussed XimpleWare6, to the Author’s
knowledge, XimpleWare has not yet received a game-theory analysis
thoroughly exploring its rich potential as a compliance-based defensive
tactic. Particularly, XimpleWare exemplifies an open source topology
affording unique strategic opportunities unavailable to many other
compliance-based tactics.7 Accordingly, this Article abstracts from the
XimpleWare topology to determine when and to what extent a defendant may
employ such tactics to enhance their bargaining position (Section II). This
Article then examines countermeasures a plaintiff may employ to mitigate
such tactics’ effectiveness (Section III).

4. Indeed, the threat of enforcement may even suffice to obviate the business dynamic which
precipitated the plaintiff’s action. For example, consider where a plaintiff sues a defendant to secure
market share for their product. The revelation that their product is non-compliant with an upstream
agreement, however, coupled with a high cost (perhaps impossible) to remediate, may obviate the
plaintiff’s ability to remain in the market. In the open source context, this may occur when the plaintiff
pervasively integrated a copyleft component into a well-established product offering and the copyleft
requirements prevent profitable licensing terms.
5. In addition to the benefits relative to extortion discussed herein, copyright infringement also
proceeds under the “separate-accrual” rule, wherein the three-year statute of limitations is reset for each
new infringing act. See, e.g., Petrella v. MGM, 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1964 (2014) (“A claim ordinarily accrues
when an infringing act occurs. Under the separate-accrual rule that attends the copyright statute of
limitations, when a defendant has committed successive violations, each infringing act starts a new
limitations period. However, under § 507(b), each infringement is actionable only within three years of
its occurrence.”).
6. See, e.g., Jaideep Reddy, The Consequences of Violating Open Source Licenses, BERKLEY
TECH. L.J,: THE BOLT (November 8, 2015), http://btlj.org/2015/11/consequences-violating-open-sourcelicenses/ (While recognizing that open source breaches may be costly, commentators generally stop short
of rigorously characterizing that cost or exploring the factors affecting its viability as a negotiation tool).
7. In many ways, open source software presents a strategic “perfect storm” for the threat-maker.
As discussed herein, open source asymmetrically benefits the threat-maker in that it obviates extortion
counterarguments, permits open information gathering by the threat-maker (many companies’ software
can be reverse-engineered or publicly reviewed), provides for “separate accrual” of copyright
infringement actions, and favors the threat-maker in the timing with which they threaten the infringer, or
approach the copyright-holder for purchase. Such asymmetries will likely increase the tactic’s prevalence
in the future.
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I. EXAMPLE PATTERN: XIMPLEWARE V. VERSATA
A. XimpleWare Specific Litigation Topology
XimpleWare, as used in this Article, refers to the following five cases,
three in Texas and two in California:
1. Texas Federal, Western District: Case No. 1:10cv792 - Versata
Software Inc. v. Infosys;
2. Texas State, Travis County: Case No. D-1-GN-12-003588: Versata Software Inc. f/k/a Trilogy Software, Inc. and Versata
Development Group Inc. f/k/a Trilogy Development Group Inc. v.
Ameriprise Financial Inc., et al.;
3. Texas Federal, Western District: Case No. 1:14-cv-12 - Versata
Software Inc. v. Ameriprise Financial Services Inc. et al.;
4. California Federal, Northern District: Case No. 3:13cv5160: XimpleWare Corp. v. Versata Software Inc., Trilogy Development
Group, Inc., Ameriprise Financial, Inc., Ameriprise Financial
Services, Inc., Aurea Software, Inc.; and
5. California Federal, Northern District: Case No. 5:13cv5161 XimpleWare Corp. v. Versata Software Inc., Aurea Software Inc.,
Trilogy Development Group, Inc., Ameriprise Financial Services,
Inc., Ameriprise Financial, Inc., United HealthCare Services, Inc.,
Waddell & Reed, Inc., Aviva USA Corporation, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, Pacific Life Insurance Company, The
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Inc., Wellmark, Inc.
Initially, in the Texas cases, Versata accused Ameriprise and its affiliate
Infosys of violating the technology license agreement for Versata’s
Distribution Channel Management (“DCM”) software.8 Particularly, Versata
alleged that Infosys decompiled and reverse engineered the DCM’s source
code in 2008-2009, violating several express prohibitions in the DCM
agreement (Action #1).9 Versata alleged that Infosys then used the
knowledge gained from the decompilation on behalf of Ameriprise (Actions
8. See, e.g., Pl’s. Third Am. Compl. at 4, Versata Software Inc. v. Infosys Technologies Ltd.
(2014), (No.1:10-cv-00792-SS), 2014 WL 10321037.
Infosys, acting through its agents and employees, improperly accessed, utilized, copied, disassembled, and
decompiled Versata’s confidential source code in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, Infosys was providing software
maintenance services for Ameriprise at the same time that Versata provided software services to Ameriprise.
Infosys’ agents and employees, working on Versata’s code base at Ameriprise, decompiled Versata’s DCM source
code and created new code for the benefit of Infosys.

9. Id. at 4; 9-11, “Subsections (d) and (e) are even more specific, and prohibit Infosys from
copying, reproducing, disassembling, decompiling, or reverse engineering Versata’s confidential
information”.
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#2, #3).10 Consequently, Versata alleged copyright infringement,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, among other
causes of action.11
During the course of this Texas litigation, however, Ameriprise
discovered that Versata’s DCM itself did not appear to comply with the
license terms for at least one of its upstream components.12 Particularly,
DCM used a software component called VTD-XML, which was developed
by the California company XimpleWare. XimpleWare released VTD-XML
under the General Public License v2.0 (GPLv2.0), an open source license.13
The GPLv2.0 requires, among other things, that downstream distributors of
derivative works provide the distribution under the GPLv2.0, and that the
distributor make available the derivative work’s source code to downstream
recipients.14 According to court documents, upon discovering that Versata’s
distribution of DCM did not comply with the GPL’s requirements,
Ameriprise notified XimpleWare of the noncompliance.15
XimpleWare subsequently initiated litigation against both Versata and
Ameriprise in California (Actions #4 and #5) based upon the noncompliant
distribution and use of the GPLv2.0 licensed VTD-XML (Ameriprise, as a
non-compliant downstream user of the code was likewise alleged to have
committed copyright infringement).16 XimpleWare also sued Versata’s
customers (e.g., Pacific Life Insurance, Wellmark, Inc., etc.) for various
actions, including, e.g., patent infringement.17 While courts have not yet
considered all provisions of the GPLv2.0 specifically, courts have generally
10. Id. at 10, “Infosys employees used and copied the decompiled code on numerous occasions, for
commercial gain, in their work for Ameriprise”.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Y. Peter Kang, XimpleWare, Versata Settle Insurance Software IP Dispute, LAW360,
(Februrary 11, 2015, 6:24 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/620898/ximpleware-versata-settleinsurance-software-ip-dispute.
13. VTD-XML: The Future of XML Processing, SOURCEFORGE, http://vtd-xml.sourceforge.net/.
14. See, e.g., GNU General Public License , version 2, GNU Operating System (June 1991),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html.
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under Section 2) in object code or executable
form under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code, which must be distributed under
the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for software interchange; or,
...
This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary programs.

15. Complaint at 9, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 3:13-cv-05160-SI (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (“During the prosecution of that lawsuit, Ameriprise informed XimpleWare that it had
discovered portions of XimpleWare’s GPL-licensed Source Code in the source code of Versata’s DCM
product”).
16. Id. at 10-11.
17. Complaint at 9-14, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 5:13-cv-05161-PSG
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013).
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expressed a willingness to enforce open source licenses.18 For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit enforced the Artistic License in
Jacobsen v. Katzer.19 In face of all these actions, each of the XimpleWare
parties eventually settled their respective litigations.20
Figure 1 summarizes the XimpleWare litigation topology in graphical
form.

FIGURE 1: Simplified XimpleWare Litigation Topology

18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc., 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Copyright holders who engage in open source licensing have the right to control the modification and
distribution of copyrighted material.”). Note, however, that CAFC considered the Artistic License, rather
than the GPL, in Katzer. While at least some of the GPL’s provisions are likely enforceable, some, such
as the copyleft implications for dynamic linking, remain quite controversial.
20. See, e.g., Peter Kang, XimpleWare, Versata Settle Insurance Software IP Dispute, Law360 (Feb.
11, 2015, 6:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620898/XimpleWare-versata-settle-insurancesoftware-ip-dispute.
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What can a practitioner discern from this pattern? Was it prudent for
Ameriprise to inform XimpleWare of Versata’s breach? Did Ameriprise’s
disclosure to XimpleWare improve Ameriprise’s bargaining position? What
could Versata have done differently to mitigate such behavior? This Article
provides an analytical framework for considering and answering, or at least
clarifying, these questions.
B. Generalized Litigation Topology
Figure 2 abstracts from the XimpleWare fact pattern provided above to
illustrate a more generalized set of relationships.

FIGURE 2: Generalized Strategic Litigation “Spatial” Topology
In this diagram, the arrows represent “influence” pressures, which may
take the form of litigation, but may also represent more general methods of
coercion (e.g., they may include “market pressures” as when customers elect
a substitute product). The reader may find it useful to print this diagram and
keep it at hand for the remainder of the discussion. The symbols are as
follows:
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Parties
ΠA: The “plaintiff” party(ies) (e.g., Versata) bringing the initial action,
or having cause for action, A1 against the “defendant” party(ies) Δ;
Δ: The “defendant” party(ies) (e.g., Ameriprise) to ΠA’s action;
ΠB: The true copyright owner (e.g., XimpleWare) of the open source
software distributed in a non-compliant fashion by ΠA; and
C: The “customers” of ΠA who use ΠA’s non-compliant software (as in
XimpleWare Δ may also be a member of C).
Influence Pressures (e.g., Actions / Causes for Action)
A1: The initial action, or basis for action, by ΠA against Δ;
B1: Δ’s action, which may be directly responsive to A1, e.g., a
counterclaim, brought against ΠA;
C1, C2: The copyright owner ΠB’s action, or basis for action, against
ΠA and Δ respectively (note that in many fact pattern variations C2 will
not exist);
C3: The copyright owner ΠB’s action, or basis for action, against the
downstream customers C of ΠA; and
D1: The responsive action, or pressured response, by the downstream
customers C against ΠA.
Note that not all of the influence pressures may be present at the same
time (initially, e.g., there may only be A1).
Section II analyzes this topology to discern general principles
governing Δ’s behavior when threatening ΠA with disclosure of ΠA’s open
source violation. Section III then briefly considers countermeasures to these
principles available to ΠA.
II. COMPLIANCE-BASED DEFENSE TACTICS
This Section focuses upon Δ’s perspective, specifically, how Δ may
mitigate or otherwise influence A1 in view of the pressures upon ΠA
following disclosure. Particularly, unlike other compliance-based tactics,
e.g., situations where Δ has not itself directly suffered harm, Δ may often
threaten ΠA without fearing allegations of extortion. Δ will often be a third
party-beneficiary of the open source license and most jurisdictions will not
consider the threat of a legitimate third-party claim (and in some cases, even
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a questionable claim) an extortive act.21 As discussed in greater detail below,
such claims will have the incidental effect of informing ΠB of the
noncompliance and therefore, are often coeval with threatening such
notification. This freedom permits Δ greater latitude when structuring its
threat as compared to other compliance-based tactics susceptible to extortion
counter actions.22
Thus, let us assume that Δ is rational, i.e., that Δ is not merely seeking
to punitively harm ΠA by disclosing the violation without consideration to
the consequences.23 Rather, Δ seeks to make a credible threat to ΠA regarding
the disclosure, likely to precipitate a favorable conclusion of A1 for Δ. ΠA
will only consider such a threat credible and take action regarding A1 if: 1)
the resultant harm to ΠA from the disclosure will meaningfully compel ΠA
21. In XimpleWare specifically, the defendant Ameriprise sought to compel Versata to disclose its
source code in compliance with the GPL as a third party beneficiary. Though the court did not ultimately
rule on the motion, a favorable ruling would have been likely in view of the other case law identified
herein. See, e.g., Remand Order at 9, Versata Software, Inc., v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (2014) (No.A1-14-cv-12-ss), 2014 2014 WL 950065 (“Having found no basis for federal jurisdiction over this claim,
the Court need not determine whether Ameriprise has standing to enforce the GPL as a third-party
beneficiary.”); See also GPL_response, Versata Software, Inc., v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (2014)
(No.A-1-14-cv-12-ss), 2014 WL 950065 (“Ameriprise asserts that it is a third-party beneficiary of the
GNU General Public License (Doc. No. 9-3, the ‘GPL’) and as such is entitled to receive the source code
to Versata’s software product called, Distribution Channel Management (‘DCM’). Pursuant to the GPL,
any party who, like Versata, distributes software that incorporates code licensed under the GPL must
provide all the source code for the software being distributed, including formerly proprietary code.
Ameriprise seeks to enforce the contractual right requiring Versata to produce its DCM source code to
Ameriprise. Versata incorrectly asserts that copyright law preempts Ameriprise’s claim to the source
code. Ameriprise’s claim to be a third-party beneficiary of the GPL, however, is not preempted because
the rights granted by the GPL are essentially the opposite of copyright and, in particular, there is no
equivalent third-party-beneficiary claim in copyright law”).
22. Note that this third party beneficiary basis may serve to obviate claims of extortion by ΠA as Δ
is merely “exercising its rights”. Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in bad faith, does not
constitute extortion. As noted by Justice Holmes, “‘As a general rule, even if subject to some exceptions,
what you may do in a certain event you may threaten to do, that is, give warning of your intention to do
in that event, and thus allow the other person the chance of avoiding the consequences.’” McKay v. Retail
Auto. Salesmen’s Local Union No. 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 321 (1940) (quoting Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92, 107 (1896)), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1941); See also, e.g., U.S. v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d
1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A threat to litigate, by itself, is not necessarily “wrongful” within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act. After all, under our system, parties are encouraged to resort to courts for the
redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights.”);
Accordingly, while for simplicity, this Article often characterizes Δ’s threat to ΠA as “I’ll tell
ΠB”, in practice, the threat would more typically resemble “I’ll file my third party beneficiary
counterclaim indirectly notifying ΠB”. The latter may be especially likely in jurisdictions, such as
California, affording ΠA a civil cause of action for extortion.
23. Some practitioners have scoffed to the Author at this level of analysis, responding (to
paraphrase) “isn’t it enough just to have one more vehicle for hurting the other fellow?” Such a crude
assessment ignores the possibility that disclosure may irrevocably escalate the situation, forcing a state
of total-war between otherwise reconcilable parties. Still, in some situations, practitioners may be inclined
to disclose without threatening to avoid allegations of extortion. Distinguishing extortion from settlement
bargaining may depend upon the third party beneficiary options under B1, the manner in which Δ makes
ΠA aware of the noncompliance, the relationship between the violation an A1, and case law in the relevant
jurisdiction. As previously discussed, most courts would likely favor the third party beneficiary claim.
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to resolve A1; and 2) the harm to Δ resulting from the disclosure does not
itself obviate Δ’s reasons for disclosing.24 These requirements are referred to
as the “credibility conditions” herein and are discussed in greater detail in
Section II.A.25
With an eye to these credibility conditions, Δ will consider: 1) is it
worthwhile for Δ to even pose the threat (Section II.B); and if so, 2) how
should Δ pose the threat to ΠA so that the threat is most effective (Section
II.C)? Phrased differently, Δ, as a rational actor, will reason backward from
ΠA’s perceived consequences of the disclosure to determine if it is worth
threatening to disclose (Section II.B). If it is worth threatening to disclose, Δ
should present the threat to ΠA so as to maximize Δ’s bargaining gains
(Section II.C).
A. Qualitative Assessment of the Threat Credibility Conditions
To reiterate, for Δ’s disclosure threat to ΠA to be effective, ΠA must
believe two things:
Condition 1: Disclosure will substantially mitigate ΠA’s willingness to
pursue A1; and
Condition 2: Disclosure will not unreasonably expose Δ to risk.
Let us restate these conditions more rigorously in terms of pseudoalgebraic parameters. These parameters will allow us to more succinctly
categorize the effects of each party’s actions.26 Just as we’ve assumed that Δ
24. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE, Introduction Pg. 3 (“But in the world
of coercive diplomacy, threats and assurances must be balanced through a process of clear and credible
signaling, and enforceable bargains must be struck short of total defeat or victory for either side. Without
credible threats, coercion is obviously ineffective. But what is less well understood is that coercion is
also unlikely to be effective without simultaneously transmitted credible assurances that the threat
is fully conditional upon the target’s behavior and that the target’s key security interests will not be
harmed if it complies with the demands of those leveling the threats. Without receiving both threats
and assurances in concert, the target of a coercive threat has little incentive to comply with the
demands being made,” emphasis added).
25. Indeed, that the conditions are in fact true, and not simply perceived as true, may be more
effective. Thomas Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 281-306 (1956) (“How
does one person make another believe something? The answer depends importantly on the factual
question, ‘Is it true?’ It is easier to prove the truth of something that is true than of something false.”).
26. When performing analysis such as these, the author rarely adheres to a “strict” application of
game theory. Indeed, some researchers question if it if even possible to apply game theory in practical
contexts. See, e.g., Ariel D. Procaccia, Game Theory Is Useful, Except When It Is Not, SYMPOSIUM
MAGAZINE (Dec. 31, 2013) http://www.symposium-magazine.com/game-theory-is-useful-except-whenit-is-not-ariel-d-procaccia/. The Author often references the “Surprise Hanging Paradox” as an example
of an over-confident application of induction-style game theory arguments. See, Unexpected hanging
paradox, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox (last visited Nov. 15,
2016);
See
also,
e.g.,
How
Common
Sense
May
Trump
Game
Theory
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is rational, let us assume that ΠA is rational (we will relax these assumptions
as we proceed).
Regarding the first condition, assume that ΠA has initiated or threatened
A1 because ΠA’s perceived benefit to initiating A1 (BenefitA1) exceeds ΠA’s
perceived cost for initiating A1 (CostA1), i.e.:

𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 > 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏

(1)

For example, ΠA may be willing to pay $2 Million in attorney fees
(CostA1) for a $40 Million judgment (BenefitA1). Absent action by Δ, this cost
may simply be ΠA’s litigation expenses. If ΠA believes that it will recover
attorney fees, these expenses may be perceived as nominal or zero. To make
ΠA’s pursuit of A1 untenable, or at least very unpalatable, Δ should seek to
increase the additional cost to ΠA from the open source violation disclosure
(Disclosure_CostΠA) so as to negate BenefitA1. Preferably, ΠA should believe
at the time Δ poses the threat that:

𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 < 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜫𝑨

(2)

If Equation (2) is true, then the threat to disclose to ΠA would credibly
obviate the benefit of A1. Accordingly, ΠA would be unreasonable to ignore
the threat. If Equation (2) is not true, then ΠA should be indifferent to Δ’s
threat.
Setting aside the first condition, for now, the second credibility
condition requires that Δ not unreasonably expose itself to risk by making
the disclosure. Particularly, as evidenced by C2, the disclosure may likewise
result in Δ becoming subject to suit by ΠB. In addition, Δ may become
exposed to procedural costs/risks if it discloses, e.g., where a protective order
or nondisclosure agreement is in place prohibiting such disclosures (See,
Section II.C.2 infra). These costs to Δ resulting from the disclosure are
cumulatively referred to herein as Disclosure_CostΔ.27 If Disclosure_CostΔ
is much greater than the loss Δ would suffer if ΠA succeeds in A1
(A1_LossΔ), then it is not credible that Δ would disclose and incur the
https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2014/09/28/how-common-sense-may-trump-game-theory/
(last
visited Oct. 30, 2016). Accordingly, the author instead finds it useful to use quantitative relations only
insofar as they inform more qualitative assessments, hence, “pseudo-algebraic” reasoning.
27. To simplify, let us incorporate the probability of these costs being incurred into their qualitative
value (e.g., discounting based upon their likelihood and Δ’s risk aversion, etc.). A practitioner presented
with very specific facts may instead consider the variance associated with each parameter’s probability
in their analysis.
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additional Disclosure_CostΔ.28 Stated differently, if A1 only presents a de
minimis harm to Δ, but disclosure presents a very great harm, why would Δ
put itself in jeopardy of such a greater harm to avoid a smaller harm?29 Thus,
the second credibility condition appears to imply that ΠA believe:

𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 ≫ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫

(3)

However, this statement only captures a subset of the circumstances
under which the second condition would be credible. As mentioned, ΠA will
expect Δ to suffer both A1_LossΔ and Disclosure_CostΔ following
disclosure.30 Accordingly, a more accurate statement of the second condition
would reflect ΠA’s belief that Δ is willing to bear both A1_LossΔ and
Disclosure_CostΔ following disclosure. This “willingness” is contextual. For
example, if A1_LossΔ will clearly bankrupt Δ then what reason has Δ to fear
Disclosure_CostΔ? The second condition becomes irrelevant – Δ has nothing
to lose and only something to gain by disclosing. Similar contextual
variations will scale terms in the inequality. To account for this contextual
effect, let us introduce a proportional weighting factor Ccontext adjusting
Disclosure_CostΔ to account for ΠA’s belief in Δ’s appreciation of future
losses resulting from the disclosure.

𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 > 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫

(4)

Thus, in the bankruptcy scenario discussed above, Ccontext will be 0, as
Δ will consider the additional Disclosure_CostΔ irrelevant. Similarly, if
Disclosure_CostΔ presents a finite, manageable harm, Ccontext becomes 1. If
ΠA relaxes Δ’s rationality (e.g., as the parties approach an irrational state of
total conflict) Ccontext can become < 1, etc.
Note that Ccontext has a (roughly) inverse effect upon the first condition.
When Ccontext is 0, as in the bankruptcy scenario, Δ may as well enter a state

28. Note that A1_LossΔ includes both the effects of judgment against Δ as well as Δ’s cost to defend.
This asymmetry relative to CostA1 will become relevant in the subsequent discussion of bargaining power.
To restate the matter more explicitly, increasing CostA1 (e.g., increasing ΠA’s attorneys’ fees) lowers the
stakes for ΠA,, but increasing A1_LossΔ (e.g., increasing Δ’s attorneys’ fees) increases the stakes for Δ.
29. In other words, the response would be disproportionate. Typically, Menelaus’ waging massive
inter-state warfare is a disproportionate response to the isolated act of Helen’s infidelity. Of course, these
things happen, they’re just not rational. Ccontext will be used to relax rationality in the subsequent sections.
30. To rephrase the observation, ΠA will generally believe the threat if Δ’s end condition is
plausible. Not only a small Disclosure_CostΔ but any Disclosure_CostΔ meeting that condition will
suffice.
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of total conflict (i.e., the motive is no longer to influence ΠA, but simply to
cause harm). Accordingly, let us state the final, pseudo-algebraic parameter
representations of the credibility conditions as follows:

Condition 1: 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑨𝟏 <

(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑨𝟏 +𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜫𝑨 )
𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡

Condition 2: 𝐴1_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝚫 > 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝚫

(5)
(6)

As mentioned in the preceding footnote, this framework is clearly not
intended to establish “hard and absolute” numerical rules and relationships.
The amorphous character of Ccontext will require the practitioner to carefully
consider their particular situation before attempting to assign a numerical
value.31 Indeed, the value of Ccontext in Condition 1 may not be exactly the
same in Condition 2, and separate parameters may be more suitable. For this
Article’s purposes, however, this framework will permit us to more
rigorously evaluate the consequence to Δ’s threat from each of the legal
considerations.
Thus, Conditions 1 and 2 inform Δ’s decision to disclose and the
threat’s persuasive effect upon ΠA. Section II.B focuses on Condition 1,
discussing how Δ can maximize Disclosure_CostΠA and minimize Ccontext so
as to persuade ΠA that disclosure will cause ΠA genuine harm (in other
words, “is posing the threat worthwhile to Δ?”). Section II.C then focuses on
both Conditions 1 and 2, discussing how Δ can minimize Disclosure_CostΔ
and again minimize Ccontext by posing the threat in a credible manner (in other
words, “how should Δ pose the threat?”). As discussed in Section II.C, some
of these actions (e.g., purchasing ΠB’s copyright) may have the secondary
effect of also increasing Disclosure_CostΠA.
B. Influencing A1 - “Is Threatening Worthwhile”?
With regard to Condition 1, Δ should maximize Disclosure_CostΠA and
minimize Ccontext. Disclosure_CostΠA generally depends upon three
consequences following from the disclosure:
1) The remedies sought by ΠB against ΠA;
31. Consider, e.g., a somewhat particular situation where Δ’s board of directors anticipate declaring
bankruptcy and pursuing a new venture dependent upon the goodwill of ΠA. Thus, the preceding
motivations following from bankruptcy no longer apply here and Ccontext is no longer 0. The parameter’s
new value will depend upon how much the disclosure jeopardizes the future venture, a likely qualitative,
amorphous consideration. In application, the practitioner will need to consider their specific
circumstances.
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2) Newly available counterclaims B1 by Δ against ΠA; and
3) Pressures D1 from downstream customers C precipitated by C3.
The following sections consider these consequences in turn.
1. The Remedies Sought by ΠB Against ΠA
An open source license’s breach may precipitate several causes of
action in C1. In past cases, direct copyright infringement, indirect copyright
infringement, violation of the Lanham Act § 43, unfair competition, breach
of contract, tortious interference with business relations / intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage, misappropriation, breach
of implied covenant of Good Faith and Fair dealing, unjust enrichment, etc.
have all appeared.32 Naturally, plaintiffs typically seek both injunctive and
monetary relief for these causes of action where available.33 It is important
that Δ carefully consider the character of the injunctive and monetary relief
sought by ΠB as these will inform value of Disclosure_CostΠA. Additionally,
this relief will also influence the likelihood that ΠB will bring the action C1
in the first place (indeed the foundation for Δ’s threat to ΠA). To simplify,
let us assume that this probability is already reflected within
Disclosure_CostΠA , since they are (to a certain extent) positively correlated
(i.e., the more value ΠB ascribes to the action C1, the more likely ΠB is to
bring the action C1). Thus, the greater the consequences to ΠA from ΠB’s
injunctive and monetary relief, the higher Disclosure_CostΠA.
a. Injunctive Relief
In most open source breach scenarios, the preferred relief is injunctive.
In Jacobsen v. Katzer, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit upheld a request for preliminary injunction where the defendant had
not complied with the terms of the Artistic License.34 The court observed
that in many cases, monetary damages would not be available to an open
source plaintiff as there were no lost profits associated with the breach:
Copyright licenses are designed to support the right to exclude; money
damages alone do not support or enforce that right. The choice to exact
consideration in the form of compliance with the open source requirements
of disclosure and explanation of changes, rather than as a dollar
denominated fee, is entitled to no less legal recognition. Indeed, because a
calculation of damages is inherently speculative, these types of license
32. E.g., Complaint at 1, Ximpleware, Inc., v. Versata Software, Inc., et al., No. 3:13-cv-05160-SI
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (this particular list is taken in part from the XimpleWare complaint).
33. Id.
34. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376.
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restrictions might well be rendered meaningless absent the ability to enforce
through injunctive relief.35

For a permissive license, e.g., the MIT or BSD license, simply including
an absent copyright notice may suffice to cure the deficiency. Consequently,
the injunctive relief for these licenses typically present poor vehicles for
increasing Disclosure_CostΠA, as compliance may simply be a tedious
inconvenience for ΠA and C. While not substantial, such smaller compliance
costs may still serve Δ’s purposes if BenefitA1 is “low” or CostA1 is “high”.
Indeed, in Jacobsen v. Katzer, the defendant incurred both the costs of a
district court and federal appeal by simply failing to include the required
notice.36 Such small stakes litigation will likely be the exception, rather than
the rule, however, given the high costs involved in ΠA’s bringing legal
action.
In higher stakes litigation, Δ would need a more compelling violation if
Δ intends to rely upon the injunction to increase Disclosure_CostΠA. Less
permissive open source licenses in conjunction with ΠA’s business structure,
may serve this purpose. For example, some open source licenses include
strong copyleft requirements (e.g., the GPL or Sleepycat licenses). These
copyleft provisions may require not only that the original open source code
be made available in source code form, but that ΠA provide its entire
commercial product (or a substantial portion) in source code form.37 Whether
this is the case will depend upon the exact terms of the license and the nature
of ΠA’s commercial product.38 Requiring that ΠA disclose its source code
35. Id. at 1382 (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. For example, the GPL has always been viewed as applying to both statically and dynamically
linked libraries, See Frequently Asked Questions about the GNU Licenses, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM
(May 26, 2016) http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html#GPLStaticVsDynamic (05/26/2016)
(“Does the GPL have different requirements for statically vs dynamically linked modules with a covered
work? (#GPLStaticVsDynamic) No. Linking a GPL covered work statically or dynamically with other
modules is making a combined work based on the GPL covered work. Thus, the terms and conditions of
the GNU General Public License cover the whole combination.). See also GNU GENERAL PUBLIC
LICENSE, version 2, License, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-faq.en.html# (05/26/2016) (What legal
issues come up if I use GPL-incompatible libraries with GPL software?”). The consequences of a
violation in this context will need to be carefully evaluated by Δ. If the linking is to an isolated module
of ΠA’s product, then only that module will be subject to the GPL.
38. To maximize Disclosure_CostΠA the open source code would ideally be interwoven with the
commercial product such that the license’s terms apply to the product’s entirety and such that the open
source code cannot be easily separated or substituted. When this is not the case, however, the violation
may still suffice to raise Disclosure_CostΠA so long as ΠB has a basis for demonstrating sufficient
damages. Consider a violation of the GPLv2.0. In some ways, whether the code was dynamically linked,
statically linked, or copied directly is irrelevant. This is because when ΠB experiences grave financial
harm from the violation, that harm is unlikely to arise from the infringement itself (since compliant
distributions were freely available). Rather, ΠB’s financial interest arises from secondary factors, such as
the market or ΠB’s business structure. But if this the character of the harm, then another basis (e.g., an
unfair competition claim) probably suffices to Disclosure_CostΠA.
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may have devastating consequences for ΠA. For example, where ΠA operates
in the defense industry or in a litigious patent market, source code
availability may fail to comply with the DFARs or expose ΠA to an
infringement action, respectively.39 Perhaps more importantly, copyleft
provisions may also deny the addition of commercial terms.40 These
commercial terms may have been required to make ΠA’s product profitable.
Much service software includes nontrivial royalty determinations based
upon the character of the customer’s usage.41 Requiring these terms’ removal
could be devastating to ΠA.
Thus, an injunction requiring compliance with a copyleft license may
deny ΠA the enjoyment of a market advantage it previously held relative to
its competitors. Disclosure_CostΠA will then include at least: 1) the future
loss of this advantage; 2) the remediation cost for the past violations; and 3)
reputational harm from those who would have benefited from the earlier
compliance. Indeed, if financial data regarding ΠA’s past profits are
available, Δ would likely seek to ascertain the loss in market advantage to
clarify Disclosure_CostΠA. Similarly, Δ should be able to readily ascertain
the consequences to existing market share when remediating (discussed in
greater detail below with respect to C3 and D1).
Despite these potentially onerous outcomes, there may be factors
insulating ΠA from monetary damage flowing from the injunction.
Obviously, insurance can provide such insulation, but prolonged
noncompliance itself may also serve to insulate ΠA from these injunctive
damages. Particularly, being the “first to market” is often the dispositive
factor in software sales as the first entrant may displace opportunities for
follow-on entrants.42 ΠA may have eliminated the competition in this manner
39. See GNU General Public License, version 2, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (June, 1991),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html (“(b) You must cause any work that you
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof,
to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License”). See, e.g.
Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software (OSS), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Oct. 16, 2009),
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/OSSFAQ/2009OSS.pdf (“The use of any software
without appropriate maintenance and support presents an information assurance risk. Before approving
the use of software (including OSS), system/program managers, and ultimately Designated Approving
Authorities (DAAs), must ensure that the plan for software support (e.g., commercial or Government
program office support) is adequate for mission need.”).
40. See GNU General Public License, version 2, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (June, 1991),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html (“(b) You must cause any work that you
distribute or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof,
to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License”).
41. Consider, e.g., the varied licensing terms of SAP PRODUCT STEWARDSHIP NETWORK LICENSES
http://go.sap.com/product/plm/product-stewardship-network.licensing-purchasing.html.
42. The first mover advantage is a very market-centric analysis and subject to many exceptions.
Consider, Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth of First-Mover Advantage, HARV. BUS.
REV., (Apr. 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/04/the-half- truth-of- first-mover- advantage.

2016

OPEN SOURCE TACTICS

17

by virtue of the noncompliance (e.g., repurposing an already existing open
source solution rather than developing its own from scratch). Being forced
to now comply, after the competition is gone, would do little to raise
Disclosure_CostΠA, unless that competition returns.
If this is the situation, Δ should identify competitors and new entrants
who may be able to take advantage of ΠA’s forced compliance via injunction.
A competitor who may have “given up” may now find that it has the
advantage by virtue of its (mistakenly) late-to-market, proprietary solution
which does not rely upon the open source component. Where ΠA’s product
is not purely software (e.g., firmware or hardware), Δ can be somewhat more
confident that this market displacement has less insulating effect (though this
will depend upon the context).43 In any event, if this insulating effect is large,
Δ should consider whether antitrust actions, or unfair business competition
actions, will suffice to return Disclosure_CostΠA to its pre-insulation value.
b. Monetary Relief
As discussed above in relation to Jacobsen v. Katzer, the most common
remedy for an open source violation may be injunctive relief. As the software
was generally available for “free”, permissive open source licenses will
typically result in few, if any, monetary damages for copyright infringement,
save the possibility of some statutory damages.44 To achieve substantial
monetary damages under the copyright, tortious interference with business
relations, antitrust, and other causes of action, ΠB must operate its business
such that ΠA’s abuse of the license resulted in a tangible profit loss to ΠB.
ΠB’s profit loss may occur in several ways. Certainly, unfair
competition may present opportunities for monetary damages in the form of
lost profits, though Δ should consider what ΠB will need to prove to
demonstrate this market loss.45 Where ΠB offered the open source software
under a “dual license” allowing licensees to accept the software under either
the open source license or a commercial license, the monetary damages may

43. Id. While not a universal rule, such products are often subject to slower change, and
consequently in the “calmer waters” referenced in this article.
44. Statutory damages require that ΠB have the foresight to register their work and provide $750 to
$30,000 per infringement of the work and an additional $150,000 for willful infringement. See, 17 U.S.C.
§504(c) (1947). However, statutory damages will often not be the best vehicle for increasing
Disclosure_CostΠA, as the damages are calculated based upon the number of copyrighted works and
number of infringers, but not the number of incidents of infringement. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad.,
Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D. Mass. 2007).
45. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code, § 3345(b) (unfair competition law is one in which the trier of fact “is
authorized by statute to impose a fine, or a civil penalty or other penalty, or any other remedy the purpose
or effect of which is to punish or deter . . .”); See also, Bank of the West v. Superior Court 2 Cal.4th 1254,
1267 (1992) (indicating that the remedy may have a “deterrent purpose and effect”).
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be more certain.46 ΠA’s failure to take either license in this scenario, will
likely result in a quantifiable unjust enrichment to ΠA or lost profits to ΠB.
Reputational harm may itself precipitate financial consequences to ΠA,
even when remediation is de minimis. Indeed, in some communities, callous
failure to comply with de minimis obligations may result in reputational harm
because they are de minimis.47 This reputational harm may precipitate
customer departures and jeopardize ΠA’s participation in future open source
projects.48 In this respect, to the extent that Δ can influence media attention
and otherwise call attention to the breach, Δ may be able to increase ΠA’s
perception of Disclosure_CostΠA.49
2. New Counterclaims B1
In some situations, disclosure may permit Δ additional counterclaims
against ΠA that may increase Disclosure_CostΠA. Δ’s ability to bring
additional counterclaims depends upon the character of the open source
deficiency and Δ’s relationship to ΠA. For example, as previously discussed,
Δ may assert that it was the third party beneficiary of a copyleft open source
license, particularly where there was an obligation to disclose source code or
provide specific terms to downstream recipients (indeed, as discussed in the
footnotes, such a counterclaim may be necessary to prevent the threat’s
characterization as extortion).
Where Δ is a customer of ΠA, ΠA may have required Δ to indemnify ΠA
or to disclaim liability for open source noncompliance. Even in these

46. For example, in Oracle America v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Oracle
provided the Java API under either the GPL open source license or a commercial license. Arguably, in
this situation, a customer’s unwillingness to comply with the GPL’s restrictive character, or to take a
commercial license, reduced the market for the commercial license (even if the customer were willing to
comply with the GPL a downstream customer may have preferred the commercial license). See Exhibit
G, Oracle America v. Google, 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 1571-8) 3:10-cv-03561 (“I determined
that Oracle’s lost profits from lost Java ME license agreements with third parties totaled $475 million.”).
This argument, however, requires that the circumstances and licensing environment encourage such an
either-or behavior between the open and commercial license.
47. Consider the example of Jacobsen v. Katzer (“The software underlying such an important legal
dispute is almost charmingly inconsequential from a commercial point of view - model railroad software.
But to the litigants, the stakes were high relative to their resources and their commitment to that niche.
The plaintiff, Robert Jacobsen, is a software developer member of the Java Model Railroad Interface
(JMRI) Project, and the defendant, Matthew Katzer, is the owner of a proprietary vendor of model train
software called KAMIND associates, d/b/a KAM Industries.”) Andy Updegrove, A Big Victory for
F/OSS: Jacobsen v Katzer is Settled, THE STANDARDS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.php?story=201002190850472.
48. Such participation may often be part of a business strategy, e.g., in a “razor / razor-blade”
business model.
49. For example, a court would generally be unlikely to entertain a criminal allegation under the
DMCA against an open source violation, but the public media and community consequences following
from such an accusation may suffice to raise Disclosure_CostΠA.
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circumstances, however, disclosure may provide the evidentiary basis for Δ
to bring an antitrust action.50 Such an action’s effectiveness will depend upon
the market posture of the parties. As discussed in the following section, Δ
may seek to align its post-disclosure position with C as much as possible, or
at least cause ΠA to perceive as much, to increase the apparent value of
Disclosure_CostΠA.
Still, in most contexts, it is unlikely that B1 will be the primary basis
for increasing Disclosure_CostΠA, because Δ is neither the copyright owner
nor the market participant originally motivated to develop the open source
software.51 Instead, as discussed in greater detail below, if Δ acquires the
copyright to the open source component from ΠB, Δ may subsume C1, C2,
and C3 within B1 so as to maximize Disclosure_CostΠA.
3. Pressures from Downstream Customers D1
ΠA’s awareness of the consequent D1 pressures will increase
Disclosure_CostΠA. As D1 directly follows from the character of C3 (e.g.,
the resultant pressures when, and if, customers become subject to an
injunctive order) Δ may analyze C3 as a proxy for D1 to a certain extent. To
this end, Δ should consider if and how ΠB will bring C3. Some ΠBs may
simply ignore C, not wishing to suffer reputational harm in the community
by suing end customers (e.g., where ΠB is an educational nonprofit).
Conversely, some ΠBs may have no choice but to pursue action against C
(e.g., where ΠB is a large corporation whose shareholders and board compel
directors to recapture lost profits). In some instances, C3 may not be present,
depending upon the customer behavior.52 Accordingly, Δ should consider the
character of ΠB when analyzing C3 and, in turn, D1.
ΠA will likely have indemnified itself or disclaimed any warranty
regarding copyright infringement in its agreements with customers C.
50. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides that any “false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact –(a) which is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake” is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). The defendant may seek damages and
an injunction. Additionally, Section 4 of the Clayton Act 1914 allows for the recovery of damages by
“any person injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” 15
U.S.C. 15(a) (2012). The claimant need merely demonstrate that “injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful” Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 US 477, 489 (1977).
51. Again, as mentioned elsewhere herein, a third party beneficiary counterclaim’s greatest value
may be in mitigating extortion allegations, effectively reducing Disclosure_CostΔ. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in
bad faith, does not constitute extortion).
52. For example, internal use and distribution does not trigger the copyleft obligations of many
otherwise onerous licenses, such as the GPL license. If the customers are not themselves distributing
infringing versions, but merely using internal copies, ΠB may have no credible basis for bringing an action
against them.
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Prudent Cs will have stipulated to these terms only subject to proper open
source diligence, representations and warranties, etc. by ΠA. The transaction
costs involved in litigating these provisions, even if simply to establish that
they are enforceable, may contribute to Disclosure_CostΠA. Cs who have not
taken such precautions may still exert considerable pressure by selecting an
alternative provider than ΠA. Since Δ may not know the character or scope
of C and C’s agreement with ΠA, Δ should make clear to ΠA that it will
apprise ΠB of as many Cs as possible if it discloses. Accordingly, any
customer lists uncovered during A1’s discovery, which are not subject to a
protective order, may be especially useful in this regard (See Section II.C.2.b
below). Naturally, however, such behavior is more likely to be condemned
in a protective order or in action seeking to determine that Δ’s threat
constitutes extortion (e.g., that it was “wrongful” by the terms of some
extortion laws).
In some instances, ΠA and Δ may share customers within C. In these
circumstances, Δ should consider whether C3 would simply provide Δ
greater market share, or would alienate customers C against Δ. This
alienation may be particularly acute if the Cs learn that Δ was the source of
the disclosure to ΠB. Accordingly, Δ may preemptively notify shared
customers C and provide them with an opportunity to comply/remediate,
before making the threat to ΠA. Naturally, the timing and character of such
a warning will depend upon C’s capacity to remediate, and Δ’s concern that
C will prematurely warn ΠA. Such premature warning may cause ΠA to
acquire the copyright from ΠB before Δ has had a chance to make its own
offer. Consequently, if Δ is considering purchasing the copyright from ΠB
(discussed in detail below in Section II.C.1), Δ should make its purchase
attempt before issuing a warning to any of C.
C. Influencing A1 - “How Should Δ Threaten”?
As the threat’s effectiveness depends upon ΠA’s perception of
Conditions 1 and 2 being true, the manner in which Δ poses the threat is of
considerable importance. Certainly, Δ’s characterization of each of the
parameters in Conditions 1 and 2 will influence ΠA as they will make the
threat more credible. But the goal is not simply to make ΠA feel threatened,
but to compel ΠA to abandon A1. If Δ loses sight of this broader goal, posing
the threat indelicately, ΠA may assume Δ intends to enter a state of total war.
ΠA may begin remediating the violation or seek to acquire the open source
copyright from ΠB, without considering whether dropping A1 would instead
be more economical. Anticipating this scenario, Δ must consider the
likelihood of ΠB’s consenting to sell the copyright to ΠA before making the
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threat to ΠA. In some circumstances, for example, where such a sale to ΠA is
likely, Δ may seek to preemptively acquire ΠB’s copyright itself before
making the threat.
1. Acquiring the Copyright
Many circumstances will compel Δ to attempt to acquire ΠB’s copyright
in the open source software. If ΠB’s purchase price is low, if
Disclosure_CostΔ is unacceptably high, or if it is unlikely that ΠB will take
action against ΠA or C, then Δ should attempt to acquire ownership of ΠB’s
copyright before posing the disclosure threat to ΠA.53 Naturally, Δ will
probably make the offer through an intermediary so that ΠB does not infer
ΠA or Δ’s noncompliance. Such an inference may cause ΠB to increase its
asking price or to initiate action before Δ has made its threat to ΠA. How
much should Δ be willing to offer ΠB? If ΠB rejects Δ’s offer, should Δ be
concerned that ΠB will accept ΠA’s offer after Δ threatens ΠA? The following
section considers each party’s ability to acquire the copyright (their
“purchase price capacity”) to answer these questions.
a. Purchase Price Capacity
Figure 3 generally illustrates Δ and ΠA’s relative purchase price
capacities (shaded regions) for ΠB’s open source copyright.

FIGURE 3: Purchase Price Capacity
53. N.B., however, that Δ’s acquiring the copyright may remove some of the antitrust and tortious
interference causes of action discussed above as it was ΠB and not Δ who suffered theses harms. In these
situations, Δ may attempt to involve ΠB in the action for those causes which Δ cannot avail itself to
increase Disclosure_CostΠA.
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Figure 3 is simply a graphical representation of the following pseudoalgebraic Equations 7 and 8:54
𝑨
𝚷𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = Max(0, 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐴1
𝑨
+ 𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡

(7)

+ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝛱𝐴
−Cost𝐴1 )
𝚫𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐴1𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 Δ
+ 𝚫𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡

(8)

+ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡Δ
𝑨
𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 and ΔOwnership_Benefit reflect the secondary, incidental
benefits accruing to each party after the purchase.55 This may include the
party’s new ability to sue the other for copyright infringement (e.g., the
ability to apply C1 or C2). Generally, ΠA should be willing to pay as much
as necessary to retain the benefit of A1 and to gain any incidental benefits
𝑨
that accompany copyright ownership (𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 ), as well as to
avoid Disclosure_CostΠA (addition provides a straightforward way to assess
the relation, but one will recognized that many real-world situations will
involve more nuanced relationships). As previously discussed, the benefit of
A1 to ΠA is already offset by the cost CostA1. Thus, the remainder is the
maximum price ΠA would be willing to pay to own ΠB’s copyright (ΠA’s
purchase price capacity). ΠA would be unreasonable to pay ΠB more than
this amount.
Δ’s analysis is similar. If Δ is committed to make the disclosure, then
purchasing the copyright will permit Δ to (hopefully) close out A1 to avoid
A1_LossΔ, to avoid Disclosure_CostΔ, and to receive any incidental benefits
that accompany copyright ownership ΔOwnership_Benefit (such as suing ΠA).
Unlike ΠA, Δ’s costs defending A1 are part of A1_LossΔ which contribute to
Δ’s purchase price capacity, while ΠA’s costs pursuing A1 detract from ΠA’s
purchase price capacity. Thus, all other things being equal, Δ may have a

54. While pseudo-algebraic one could infer actual dollar amounts from these considerations.
55. For example, where the open source license was offered under a dual commercial license, or
where it permits the owner to influence its development. Naturally, such benefits may also include Δ or
ΠA’s ability to “step in” ΠB’s shoes and bring a new cause of action against the other (e.g., C1 or C2).
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slight bargaining advantage over ΠA (as illustrated in the arbitrary values of
Figure 3).
Δ also has a slight advantage in that it can make an offer to ΠB before
A
Π . This will provide Δ with an opportunity to “prime” ΠB before ΠA can
make its offer (additionally, Δ has the benefit of making its offer without ΠA
having primed ΠB). Priming permits a party to establish a pricing reference
point that influences subsequent negotiations.56 This priming advantage may
manifest itself most acutely if it becomes clear that ΠB will not sell to Δ
during their negotiations. Once this is clear, Δ will likely begin making
outrageous offers to ΠB, with no real intention of fulfillment, expecting that
ΠB will consider its preceding refusal of these offers when ΠA makes its own
offer (e.g., causing ΠB to ignore an otherwise reasonable offer from ΠA). Δ’s
first mover advantage also manifests itself in Δ’s ability to encourage ΠB to
litigate before ΠA can make its offer. Particularly, if it again becomes clear
that ΠB will not sell to Δ, then Δ may let ΠB know of the existence of a
noncompliant licensee, without divulging that the licensee’s identity is ΠA.
This knowledge may cause ΠB to prepare for litigation, particularly where
such noncompliance has clearly resulted in a market loss to ΠB. If ΠB does
not submit to Δ’s threat, Δ will immediately inform ΠB of ΠA’s breach,
attempting to deprive ΠB of a negotiation opportunity before ΠA and ΠB enter
a state of conflict.
Despite these advantages, the prices ΠA and Δ are willing to pay for the
copyright will probably be the determining factor in ΠB’s decision to sell.
That some of the parameters influencing pricing are the same parameters in
the threat credibility conditions can affect negotiations in interesting ways.
For example, consider when Δ is making its threat to ΠA. Initially, Δ should
emphasize to ΠA how great Disclosure_CostΠA is, and how small
Disclosure_CostΔ is, so that ΠA is convinced that Conditions 1 and 2 are true.
If it becomes apparent that the threat has been ineffective, though, such
arguments may have instead simply convinced ΠA that it should be willing
to pay a higher price than Δ for the copyright (see Figure 3). At this point, Δ
may be unwise to simply backtrack and convince ΠA of the opposite view,
as confessing that Disclosure_CostΔ is in fact quite large may simply raise
𝑨
𝚷𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 . Instead, Δ will likely retract its high assessment of

56. See, e.g., Paul Herr, Priming Price: Prior Knowledge and Context Effects, 16 J. OF CONSUMER
RES. 67, 68 (Jun. 1989) (“Although priming can produce these judgmental and behavioral effects, what
interests many is its often passive nature (see especially Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi, Nature of Priming
Effects on Categorizations, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 59 (1985). Subjects do not necessarily
consciously compare the stimulus to the primed category.”).
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Disclosure_CostΠA while spurring ΠB to litigate before ΠA can make its own
offer.
To help conceptualize how parameter variations can influence the
parties’ respective purchase prices, consider Figures 4 and 5.

FIGURE 4: Example Variation “Little A1_LossΔ”
Figure 4 illustrates a situation where Δ can make a purchase price offer
competitive with ΠA’s offer, even when A1_LossΔ is “low”. Generally, such
situations will be possible because, as mentioned previously, Δ’s ability to
forego its A1 litigation costs contribute to its purchasing capacity (since
owning the copyright will avoid these costs if A1 is settled) while ΠA’s A1
litigation costs detract from its purchasing capacity (since those costs must
still be incurred to gain the benefit of A1).

FIGURE 5: Example Variation “Great A1_LossΔ”
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Figure 5 considers a situation where ΠA brought A1 punitively (i.e.,
primarily designed to harm Δ rather than benefit ΠA). For example, large
corporate conglomerates have sometimes found it effective to incur great
short-term losses to outcompete a new, small market entrant.57 This may
result in long-term benefits to the conglomerate by discouraging future
entrants in other markets.58 Consequently, depending on how confident the
conglomerate is in its long-term strategy, the goal may not be to incur a large
BenefitA1, but simply to cause a large A1_LossΔ. A large A1_LossΔ, however,
may compel the small entrant to pay a much larger price than ΠA for ΠB’s
copyright as illustrated in the figure. As illustrated in Figure 5, ΠA may not
be willing to pay a higher price even when Δ’s ownership of the copyright
will compel ΠA to abandon A1.59 Additionally, by forcing the conglomerate
to consider how much it would pay for the open source component, the
smaller entrant may compel the conglomerate to evaluate the discounted
present value of its deterrence program – an exercise the conglomerate may
not otherwise have bothered to perform.
b. Demonstrating Commitment - Failed Purchase
What if Δ is unable, or unwilling, to purchase ΠB’s copyright and knows
that both it and ΠA will be subject to devastating suits from ΠB (i.e.,
Condition 2 is unsatisfied)? Can Δ still make a convincing threat to ΠA even
when the disclosure will ensure Δ’s own destruction or near-destruction?
Often, yes. Game theory (and common sense) have long recognized that
situations involving mutual destruction or near-destruction may be the basis
for unilateral threats by demonstrating either: 1) a greater risk tolerance; or
2) commitment. With regard to risk tolerance, Δ can give ΠA the impression
that A1_LossΔ is much higher than it really is. Pursuant to Condition 2, this
will compensate for an increased Disclosure_CostΔ making the threat
credible again. Δ may also demonstrate a higher risk tolerance by including
a counterclaim threat with the disclosure threat that will escalate A1 (e.g.,
initiating reciprocal patent infringement actions). This would likewise have
the same effect as raising A_LossΔ.
57. Rightly or wrongly, large organizations are often compelled to adopt aggressive tactics against
smaller retailers (See, e.g., Drew Sandholm, Amazon’s ‘Predatory Pricing’ Questioned, CNBC (Jun. 30,
2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/06/30/amazons-predatory-pricing-questioned.html). Smaller retailers
are then themselves compelled to respond with creative countermeasures such as the compliance-based
tactics discussed herein.
58. The author understands that such strategies are not considered economic “dumping” as a matter
of relative degree.
59. To clarify, in the example of Figure 5, CostA1 and Disclosure_CostΠA together are greater than
BenefitA1.
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With respect to commitment, Δ can inform ΠA tacitly, or directly, that
it has denied itself the ability to back out of the threat (effectively reducing
Ccontext for Condition 2). For example, consider where Δ begins the threat to
ΠA with the following “dead switch” disclosure statement: “I have instructed
a third party trustee to disclose everything I am about to tell you to ΠB unless
the trustee hears of our settlement in a public news statement by the end of
tomorrow. I have already paid the trustee and the trustee is now unreachable
by any means other than that public news statement”.60 Assuming, ΠA
believes that Δ is telling the truth (which may be demonstrated by a variety
of means), Δ will have effectively eliminated Condition 2 from ΠA’s
consideration.
Effectively combining risk tolerance and commitment, Δ can also try to
convince ΠB that Δ is irrational. As discussed in greater detail in the footnote,
if Δ can credibly present the violation’s disclosure to ΠA as a “ticking time
bomb”, the suppression of which is only partially within Δ’s control, then
ΠA will be more likely to acquiesce.61
2. Δ’s Ability to Notify ΠB
Until now, the analysis has generally assumed that Δ has the ability to
disclose ΠA’s breach to ΠB at Δ’s discretion. This may not be the case.62
Consider the three factual variations:
60. Thomas Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281, 283 (Jun. 1956)(See
discussion regarding “cross my heart” commitment). Thomas Schelling, supra, “An Essay On
Bargaining” (“[I]f the buyer can accept an irrevocable commitment, in a way that is unambiguously
visible to the seller, he can squeeze the range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him,”
emphasis added). Certainly, such a theatrical entrance would align with an extortion allegation, but as
discussed previously, Δ may attempt to mitigate this risk by subsuming its behavior under the right of a
third party beneficiary counterclaim (even if Δ’s threat to disclose to ΠB were construed as extortion, Δ
could simply recharacterize the threat as the bringing of the counterclaim which would itself indirectly
notify ΠB). This theatrical example could accordingly be re-characterized to this end, e.g.: “I have
instructed my attorney trustee to file a counterclaim . . .” etc.
61. Michael Kinsley, A Nobel Laureate Who’s Got Game, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/ AR2005101101336.html.
So you’re standing at the edge of a cliff, chained by the ankle to someone else. You’ll be released, and
one of you will get a large prize, as soon as the other gives in. How do you persuade the other guy to give in, when
the only method at your disposal—threatening to push him off the cliff—would doom you both?
Answer: You start dancing, closer and closer to the edge. That way, you don’t have to convince him
that you would do something totally irrational: plunge him and yourself off the cliff. You just have to convince
him that you are prepared to take a higher risk than he is of accidentally falling off the cliff. If you can do that,
you win (emphasis added).

62. Note that this discussion concerns the ability to disclose, not the ability to threaten. “Extortion
has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of
themselves, may not be illegal.” Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299, 326, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606, 627, 139
P.3d 2, 19-20 (2006) (emphasis added). ΠA may try to raise Disclosure_CostΔ by intimating or bringing
(in jurisdictions where applicable) allegations of extortion after Δ has made its threat. E.g., In California,
“Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent . . . induced by a wrongful use
of force or fear . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE, § 518 (emphasis added). Fear, for purposes of extortion “may be
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(a) Δ discovers ΠA’s noncompliance independently of any
nondisclosure obligation (e.g., Δ discovers the noncompliance
during A1 discovery when there is no protective order in place); or
(b) Δ discovers ΠA’s noncompliance but is subject to a nondisclosure
obligation (e.g., a prior contractual nondisclosure agreement with
ΠA or a protective discovery order); or
(c) ΠB becomes aware of ΠA’s noncompliance independent of any
action by Δ (e.g., by luck or from a whistleblower within ΠA’s
organization)
Note that (a), (b), and (c) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For
example, (a) may be true before litigation occurs, then (b) may be true once
a protective order issues during litigation, and then (c) may occur
independently of A1 (e.g., by coincidence). The following sections consider
these situations in turn.
a. Fact Pattern (a) – Δ Recognizes Breach Independently of Litigation or
Any Restrictive Obligation
For the breach to be “independent of the litigation or any restrictive
obligation”, Δ should be at liberty to disclose the breach at any time of Δ’s
choosing. This would mean that Δ is under no obligation, e.g., via a license
from ΠA or by a protective order during discovery, which prevents such
disclosure. License provisions preventing Δ from disclosing violations to ΠB
are discussed in greater detail below. Δ’s circumstance will most often
accord with this fact pattern (a), as ΠA’s software will often already be
publicly accessible or at least subject to reverse engineering.

induced by a threat, either: . . . 2. To accuse the individual threatened . . . of any crime; or, 3. To expose,
or impute to him . . . any deformity, disgrace or crime” (CAL. PENAL CODE, § 519). While a compelled
settlement of A1 might be construed as “the obtaining of property”, it’s less clear that the contemplated
disclosure would be “wrongful”. As previously mentioned, if Δ can subsume its threat within its third
party beneficiary rights, those rights may obviate claims of extortion. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pendergraft, 297
F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Generally, a threat to file a lawsuit, even if made in bad faith, does
not constitute extortion”) for a federal rather than state extortion discussion.
Note that as extortion is only a criminal statute in many jurisdictions, civil remedies may not be
available to ΠA, though a successful demonstration of extortion may suffice to nullify the resulting
settlement agreement. Where civil remedies are not available ΠA may be able to introduce extortion as a
predicate basis for alleging a RICO claim, See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 321 F. Supp. 2d 825,
834 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Some jurisdictions, such as California, do recognize a civil common law cause of action for
extortion, but it’s unclear that the disclosure in question fits the pattern exemplified by this case law. For
example, the common law version appears to require that the threat maker know that the crimes it will
threaten to disclose are untrue. See, e.g., Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems 179 Cal. App. 3d 408,
426 (1986) (The Court overruled on other grounds (“To be actionable the threat of prosecution must be
made with the knowledge of the falsity of the claim”, citing Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 204
(1959)); See also, Cohen v. Brown, 173 Cal. App. 4th 302 (2009).
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Because this freedom affords the greatest bargaining power, litigious
Δs or Δs fearing litigation may proactively seek to identify their competitor’s
violations before entering into a license with ΠA and well in advance of
anticipated litigation. The former will permit Δ to retain the benefit of
knowledge of the violation (assuming its discovery is properly documented),
while still binding itself to any forward-looking restriction. The latter will
permit Δ to avoid any restrictions imposed during discovery, discussed
below.
b. Fact Pattern (b) – Δ Recognizes Breach During Litigation Discovery
Δ’s ability to disclose a violation uncovered during discovery will
depend upon the discovery context. While the public has an interest in
reviewing court filings, courts often temper that interest (to varying degrees)
based upon the parties’ interests.63 Anticipating this, an aggressive ΠA may
try to isolate documents related to potential breaches by requesting a
protective order in response to any of Δ’s discovery requests.64 This is hardly
a fool-proof defense, however. Δ’s discovery request may itself enter the
public record and encourage third party exploration of ΠA’s code.65 Where a

63. In California, the issuance and formulation of protective orders are to a large extent
discretionary. See, e.g., Coalition Against Police Abuse v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 888, 904
(Cal. App. Ct. 1985). ΠA’s task is somewhat further complicated by the fact that most federal circuits
recognize a public interest in the sharing of information uncovered during discovery.
“In Olympic Refining the Ninth Circuit established the principle which has remained the rule in this
and virtually all other circuits ever since.” (Kraszewski, supra, 139 F.R.D. at p. 159.) This rule allows sharing of
information in similar cases in order to ease the tasks of courts and litigants in the discovery process . . .”
(emphasis added) (Fn. Omitted.) (Olympic Refining Company, supra, 332 F.2d at p. 265.)

ΠA may seek to keep the violation confidential by preventing the appearance of software in the record.
Particularly, “the majority of courts, both state and federal, do not recognize a public right of access to
materials that parties exchange in discovery but do not file with the court.” Andrew D. Goldstein,
Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information Gathered Through
Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 376 (2006) (emphasis added). See also, Estate of Frankl v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886-87 (N.J. 2004) (“The universal understanding in the
legal community is that unfiled documents in discovery are not subject to public access.”) Such rules will,
however, vary between jurisdictions; See also SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n. 11 (2d Cir.
2001) (“[T]o the extent that Agent Orange relied upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) to find a
statutory right of access to discovery materials, we observe that the recent amendment to this rule provides
no presumption of filing all discovery materials, let alone public access to them.”); In contrast, see e.g.,
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The right of access
to court documents belongs to the public, and the Plaintiffs were in no position to bargain that right
away.”).
64. FRCP Rule 26 provides for protective orders (“(1) In General. A party or any person from whom
discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an
alternative on matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the deposition will be
taken.”). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
65. Suspicion can be aroused in a number of ways – even a request by Δ for documents related to
open source records that Δ knows will be denied may suffice to arouse the suspicion of a copyright owner
such that they begin their own investigation. Indeed, because ΠA’s product is typically otherwise publicly
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protective order issues, the court may be limited in the sanctions it can
impose for its breach.66 Certainly, given how little Δ need say or suggest to
ΠB for ΠB to infer the threat, the court may have difficulty establishing that
Δ violated the order, let alone determining what sanctions would be
proportional.67 Consequently, the sanctions may do little to increase
Disclosure_CostΔ. Accordingly, a more proactive ΠA may instead prefer a
contractual remedy as discussed in Section III, when Δ was a previous
customer.
c. Fact Pattern (c) – ΠB Recognizes Breach Independently of ΠA-Δ
Litigation
As timing is a critical factor in the effectiveness of Δ’s threat
presentation, premature action by the copyright holder can severely mitigate
the tactic’s effectiveness. Certainly, if ΠB asserts its rights before Δ has a
chance to threaten ΠA with the disclosure, the tactic will be unusable. Still,
it may be in Δ’s interests to acquire the copyright AFTER ΠB has discovered
the breach. Certainly, this will likely be difficult, as ΠB will be able to then
infer the value of the copyright to Δ and ΠA from the action.68 Still, ΠB’s
price may change as each of the respective litigations progress and so the
parties may revisit purchasing negotiations as their interests fluctuate.
III. COUNTERING COMPLIANCE-BASED DEFENSE TACTICS
This section provides general guidance for how ΠA may deny Δ use of
the tactics discussed above. Certain countermeasures are already apparent

accessible, it will be difficult for ΠA to demonstrate that Δ’s breach of a protective order was the “butfor” cause for an independent investigation.
66. Adam M. Josephs, The Availability of Discovery Sanctions for Violations of Protective Orders,
80 UNIV. CHICAGO L. REV. 1355, 1356-57 (2013) (“Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allows for ‘further just orders’ when a party ‘fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.’
Courts, however, have disagreed over whether these sanctions can be applied to Rule 26(c) protective
orders, though the vast majority of courts have held that they can. The discrepancy largely stems from
the debate over whether protective orders issued during discovery are discovery orders for purposes of
Rule 37 . . . The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly grant courts authority to issue sanctions in
response to violations of ‘order[s] to provide or permit discovery.’ In addition to this explicit grant of
authority, the inherent power of courts to sanction operates in the background, filling in gaps left by the
Federal Rules under certain circumstances.”)
67. For example, context alone may suffice to inform ΠB of ΠA’s breach. Should Δ solicit a meeting
with ΠB, making pointed reference to ΠB’s open source offerings while casually referencing the fact that
ΠA has brought action against Δ, ΠB would probably infer the existence of ΠA’s breach even without Δ’s
explicit notification. In such a scenario, it would likely be extremely difficult to demonstrate that Δ
violated a protective order as no discovery information (save ΠB’s identity, which is unlikely to have been
explicitly covered by the order) was used.
68. Once ΠB has begun litigation, it is more likely that ΠB will be able to play ΠA and Δ off one
another to acquire the highest purchase price capacity of the two.
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from the preceding discussion (e.g., anticipate Δ’s purchasing price, hide or
at least make ambivalent the value of CostA1 and BenefitA1, etc.).
Accordingly, this section instead briefly calls attention to proactive actions
available to ΠA, which may not be simply counterpoints to the above
discussion.
A. Trade Secret-Contract Prevention
Where, as in XimpleWare, Δ had a preexisting relationship with ΠA, ΠA
may attempt to contractually deny Δ the ability to identify and act upon open
source violations in ΠA’s products. One should note that such a provision
may require considerable foresight, indeed, more than is presently typically
applied in such contracts. Particularly, existing provisions regularly absolve
ΠA of liability to Δ for such breaches, but do not limit Δ’s disclosure options
concerning such liability.69 This section considers a contractual provision
specifically identifying the breach of an open source license as ΠA’s trade
secret, which Δ agrees to keep confidential.70 While possibly doing much to
limit Δ’s options, such a provision may still be subject to various limitations
as outlined below.
1. Relevant Trade Secret Law
The author is not aware of any specific legal doctrine, which would
prevent ΠA from characterizing ΠA’s breach of an open source license as a
trade secret. Indeed, such an act would appear to fall well within the “literal”
definition of a trade secret in most jurisdictions. For example, in California
a trade secret is defined as:
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: [¶] (1) Derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and [¶]
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.” (§ 3426.1, subd. (d).)71

Breach of an open source license is certainly “information” from which
ΠA “derives independent economic value” since it is unknown to other

69. Indeed, the Author has often seen the former, but never the latter.
70. As will be discussed in greater detail below, there are many ways to characterize this contractual
provision. For example, rather than characterize an open source breach as a “trade secret” the drafter may
include a provision indicating that ΠA’s “service providers” and associated contractual relationships are
trade secrets. The provision may deny Δ from contacting ΠA. Broadly drafted, the latter provision may
have as restrictive an effect as the former.
71. UTSA: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(1)(d).
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persons (i.e., ΠB) who could sue for damages (“economic value”) from its
“disclosure”. The contract provision itself would certainly demonstrate that
the “trade secret” was subject to “efforts . . . to maintain its secrecy”.
Not only state, but federal law, would appear to support such a trade
secret interpretation. The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) similarly
defines a trade secret as:
(3) the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if—
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information 72

Again, the breach would likely qualify as “business . . . information” by this
definition.
Under the DTSA, it may be possible for Δ to disclose the
noncompliance under a whistleblower exception, such as § 1833:
§1833. Exceptions to prohibitions
(a) In General.-This chapter does not prohibit or create a private right of
action for
(1) [. . .]; or
(2) the disclosure of a trade secret in accordance with subsection (b).
(b) Immunity From Liability for Confidential Disclosure of a Trade Secret
to the Government or in a Court Filing.
(1) Immunity.–An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly
liable under any Federal or State trade secret law for the disclosure
of a trade secret that(A) is made(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government
official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney;
and

72. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added).
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(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a
suspected violation of law; or
(B) is made in a complaint or other document filed in a
lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under
seal73

Although the statute does not define “individual”, because the term
“entity” is used separately it appears that “individual” refers only to human
persons and not business entities. Despite this specificity, if the disclosure
could be characterized as the action of an individual, rather than a breach of
Δ as an entity, the provision may protect that individual from action by ΠA.
This may simultaneously permit Δ the benefit of making good on its threat
(assuming the individual does not appear as Δ’s agent). Particularly, there
does not appear to be any reason to think that the disclosure may be made
“to an attorney” under B(A)(i), would not include a disclosure to ΠB’s
attorney.
However, the “violation of law” referred to in B(A)(ii) is not clearly a
“breach of contract”, but appears rather to refer to a breach of state or federal
law.74 This doesn’t mean that B(A)(ii) won’t provide the basis for the
individual’s disclosure, but it may be that Δ must find some other explicit
federal or state law by which an individual may disclose to ΠB’s attorney.
For example, “law” may be a state unfair competition statue, such as
California Business and Professions Code 1720075, while the federal unfair
competition provision 15 U.S.C. 45 may suffice at the federal level.76 While
superficial and mostly speculative, this Section’s brief assessment of trade
secret law should help the reader to appreciate at least the possibility of
characterizing the breach, or a related act, as falling within trade secret
protection.
2. Doctrine of Unclean Hands and Exceptions
Even if ΠA successfully categorizes the breach as a trade secret,
however, equity may prevent ΠA from enforcing the contractual provision.
In California, for example, the doctrine of unclean hands can limit the
enforcement of a contractual provision at odds with equity.
The defense of unclean hands arises from the maxim, “‘He who comes into
Equity must come with clean hands.’ “ (Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222
Cal.App.3d 1048, 1059, 272 Cal.Rptr. 250 (Blain ).) The doctrine demands that
73.
74.
75.
76.

18 U.S.C. § 1833 (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(A)(ii).
California Business and Professions Code Section §§ 17200-17210 et seq.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
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a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy. He must come
into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief,
regardless of the merits of his claim. (Precision Co. v. Automotive Co. (1945)
324 U.S. 806, 814–815, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381; Hall v. Wright (9th
Cir.1957) 240 F.2d 787, 794–795.) The defense is available in legal as well as
equitable actions. (Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of
Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 728, 39 Cal.Rptr. 64 (Fibreboard );
Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 562, 574, 250 Cal.Rptr. 33.) Whether
the doctrine of unclean hands applies is a question of fact. (CrossTalk
Productions, Inc. v. Jacobson (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 631, 639, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d
615.) The unclean hands doctrine protects judicial integrity and promotes justice.
It protects judicial integrity because allowing a plaintiff with unclean hands to
recover in an action creates doubts as to the justice provided by the judicial
system. Thus, precluding recovery to the unclean plaintiff . . .77

Because the breach of an open source contract is unlike the competitive
advantage afforded by most trade secrets, in that it imposes on the legal rights
of the open source licensor, a court may be more willing to apply unclean
hands to the provision’s enforcement. The court will need to balance the
public policy aspects of such a provision alongside the parties’ right to
contract. Certainly, making confidential the harm caused by an FDA
violation, or by illegal activity, would be unconscionable. But can failure to
comply with an open source license be considered sufficiently egregious to
obviate the parties’ right to contract?
The answer to this question may depend upon the nature of the
contractual provision’s language. For example, open source compliance is
fraught with difficulties regarding upstream licensees, authentic
representations of upstream license terms, and other complications. In one
pathological scenario, an upstream licensor may deliberately, or
accidentally, misrepresent their right to license a piece of software. For
example, a disgruntled software programmer may release her employer’s
proprietary code under the permissive MIT license. A downstream licensee
may have no way of knowing of the upstream distributor’s
misrepresentation. With regard to the abstraction of Figure 2, the diagram
would be modified as follows:

77. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 973 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999),
as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 3, 2000) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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FIGURE 6: Generalized Litigation Topology with Fraudulent
Contributor/Distributor
Here, a fraudulent distributor F is someone who purports to have the
capacity to distribute code under an open source license, when in fact only
the true owner ΠB has that right and has not authorized such a distribution.
In this situation, ΠA is “as much a victim” as C and Δ, and indeed, the
primary causes of action will be A2 and C4 against F. Where ΠA’s
contractual provision with Δ anticipates this scenario, particularly where it
only asks that ΠA be given a chance to remediate before Δ discloses, it seems
unlikely that Δ will succeed in a defense of unclean hands.78 ΠA’s motive is
no longer clearly directed to the suppression of a deliberate violation. Rather,
the contractual provision now appears to merely be a precaution against
upstream bad actors, albeit a precaution that imposes some confidentiality
restrictions on Δ. A prescient Δ will demand that the contract language be
narrowly tailored to a situation involving only an F and exclude other
violations by ΠA, but such an “aggressive” stance would be unusual in most
contractual negotiations.79

78. Such language directly anticipates, and to a certain extent, refutes the equitable basis for the
defense of unclean hands. In this manner, ΠB would generally use language in the contractual provision
directed to motives other than denying Δ access to ΠB, which have the incidental effect of denying Δ
access to ΠB.
79. The temper of such a request would often disrupt otherwise “friendly” business negotiations.
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B. Preemptive Due-Diligence
It hardly needs stating that the simplest way for ΠA to nullify the above
discussion is simply not to violate any open source agreements. Such a
factual situation obviates the entirety of the above tactic. Unfortunately,
compliance is often a nontrivial task, particularly where a product
incorporates many different open source components. A proactive ΠA should
impose ongoing compliance reviews and developer education to mitigate
breach opportunities. Waiting until a product’s release to perform diligence
may be imprudent, as this will require great time and cost to remediate any
previously introduced violation. Similarly, waiting to perform diligence until
preparing to bring A1 may be too late to effectively remediate (indeed, the
engineers now aware of the failure may be deposed and inadvertently
disclose the existence of a defect). Thus, an ounce of early prevention may
well be worth many pounds of cure.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to illuminate aspects of the litigation tactics that
may arise when a defendant discovers an open source violation on the part
of the plaintiff. As a bargaining tool, such knowledge can be incredibly
value, but only under the particular factual circumstances regarding the
character of the license, the interests of the copyright owner, and the nature
of the plaintiff’s business. Both parties have recourse to various defenses,
but proactive due diligence is likely the most reliable method for nullifying
the tactic’s applicability.

